Introduction
Consider a two-person zero-sum stochastic game with countable state space S, finite action sets A and B for players 1 and 2, respectively, and law of motion p. Let u be a bounded real-valued function defined on the state space S and assume that the payoff from 2 to 1 along a play (or infinite Suppose that the stochastic game begins at state z ∈ S, player 1 chooses the strategy σ, player 2 chooses the strategy τ , and E z,σ,τ is the induced expectation on the space H ∞ of all plays h. Then the expected payoff from 2 to 1 is E z,σ,τ u * .
The main objective of this chapter is to sketch the proof that this lim sup game has a value and that there is an algorithm, albeit transfinite, for calculating the value. The chapter is based on our paper (Maitra and Sudderth [7] ). A more detailed and more leisurely proof is in our book (Maitra and Sudderth [10] ).
A Remark on the Lim Sup Payoff
The payoff function u * is more general than it may first appear. To see this, make a change of coordinates z n = (z 0 , a 1 , b 1 , z 1 , . . . , a n , b n , z n ), and takeũ
where z 0 = z and r is a bounded daily payoff function. Thus lim sup games include discounted games and average reward games.
A Little History
Our work on lim sup games stems from two sources: the gambling theory of Dubins and Savage [4] and Blackwell's papers on G δ games [1] , [2] . If player 2 is a dummy with only one action, then the lim sup game becomes a nonleavable gambling problem in the sense of Dubins and Savage (cf. also [10] ). The algorithm for the value first appeared in the context of gambling theory in Dubins, Maitra, Purves, and Sudderth [3] . If the function u is the indicator function of a set W ⊂ S, then the function u * is the indicator of the set of plays
This set is a G δ , that is, a countable intersection of open sets, when S, A, and B are given the discrete topology and H ∞ has the product topology. Furthermore, every G δ subset of H ∞ can be written this way if we make the change of coordinates as in Section 2 above. When u is an indicator function, the algorithm for the value of the lim sup game is essentially that of Blackwell for G δ games.
The Algorithm
The algorithm for the value of the lim sup game uses a number of auxiliary games. Here is the first and most basic of them.
The one-day game A(u)(z): 1 chooses a ∈ A, 2 chooses b ∈ B, the next state z 1 has distribution p(·|z, a, b), and 2 pays 1 the expected value of u(z 1 ). Let (Gu)(z) be the value of A(u)(z), which exists by von Neumann's minmax theorem.
Here is the second type of auxiliary game.
The leavable game L(u)(z): 1 chooses a strategy σ in the stochastic game and a stop rule t with values in {0, 1, 2, . . .}, 2 chooses a strategy τ in the stochastic game, and 2 pays 1 the quantity E z,σ,τ u(z t ), the expected value of u evaluated at the state where the process is stopped. (Note: The stop rule t selected by player 1 is required to be finite on every history. It would not make sense to require that t be almost surely finite because player 1 does not know player 2's strategy and, therefore, does not know the probability measure on the space of histories.) This game also has a value and the value can be calculated by backward induction as follows.
where x ∨ y denotes the maximum of x and y. Finally, set
The proof of Theorem 1 uses standard techniques and is omitted here.
In the leavable game player 1 is allowed to stop the game at any time. In order to approach the lim sup game, we will force player 1 to stop later and later. As a first step, we alter the leavable game so that 1 cannot stop immediately.
The modified leavable game L * (u)(z): This is the same as L(u)(z) except that player 1 must choose a stop rule t ≥ 1.
After their first moves in this modified game, the players are faced with a leavable game as previously defined. Thus the modified game amounts to a one-day game with payoff U , and the following corollary to Theorem 1 is easy to prove.
Now define the operator T by the rule that (T u)(z) is the value of
By iterating the operator T , we can, in effect, force player 1 to stop later and later. This is one of the key ideas for finding an algorithm for the lim sup game, to which we now turn.
The nonleavable (lim sup) game N (u)(z): Player 1 chooses a strategy σ, player 2 chooses a strategy τ , and 2 pays 1 E z,σ,τ u * .
To obtain the value of this game, we iterate the operator T to force player 1 to stop later and later, but, in addition, we take the minimum with the function u at every step so that player 1 will also try to reach states where u is large.
where x ∧ y denotes the minimum of x and y. Next, set
If S is finite, then V ω (z) is the value of N (u)(z). However, in general, we must continue and define, for countable ordinal numbers α,
Finally, let
where ω 1 is the first uncountable ordinal.
Before sketching the proof of Theorem 2, we will make a few digressions. We begin with a simple example to illustrate the algorithm for V . Example 1 A simple recursive game. Recursive games are stochastic games in which payoff occurs only in absorbing states. They can be viewed as lim sup games such that, for every z ∈ Z, either u(z) = 0 or z is absorbing. Recursive games were introduced by Everett [5] , and are treated in this volume in [12] , [13] . Here is one of Everett's examples in suggestive notation. 
Passing to the limit, we see that U (0) = lim U n (0) = 1, and For general recursive games with S countable, the algorithm can continue without terminating all the way up to an arbitrary countable ordinal.
The Special Case u = 1 W
The algorithm for the value of the lim sup game is somewhat simpler in the special case when u = 1 W , the indicator function of a set W ⊂ S. If z ∈ W , then it is not difficult to show that U n (z) is the value of a stochastic game in which the payoff function is the indicator of the set
and U (z), the value of the leavable game, is also the value of a stochastic game with payoff function the indicator of the set
(This is intuitively plausible because player 1 has no incentive to stop until a state in W is reached and then it is obviously optimal for player 1 to stop.) The set [reach W ] is an open subset of H and, conversely, every open subset can be written in this form after a change of coordinates as in Section 2.
It can also be shown that, for n = 0, 1, . . ., V n (z) is the value of a stochastic game with payoff function the indicator function of the set [reach W n + 1 times] = {h : z k ∈ W for at least n + 1 indices k} and, as was mentioned in Section 3, the nonleavable game has a payoff function equal to the indicator of [W i.o.] . So it is natural to hope that its value V (z) will be equal to V ω (z) = inf V n (z). This is true when S is finite, but not in general. Example 2 Let S be the set of integers, A = {0, 1}, B = {0}, and W = {1, 2, . . .}. At any negative integer z, player 1 can move to either z − 1 or −z by taking a = 0 or a = 1; at any strictly positive z, the motion is to z − 1 regardless of the action chosen; state 0 is absorbing. It is easy to see that V ω (−1) = V n (−1) = 1 for n = 0, 1, . . ., but V (−1) = 0.
Sketch of the Proof of Theorem 2
The proof will be given in four lemmas.
Proof. It is not difficult to show that the bounded function V α (z) is nonincreasing in α for each fixed z ∈ S. By a property of the ordinals, there exists α(z) < ω 1 such that V α (z) = V α(z) (z) for all α ≥ α(z). Define α * = sup α(z). Then, by another property of the ordinals, α * < ω 1 . Also, we have
Lemma 1 says that the value of the modified leavable game L * (u∧V )(z) has value V (z) for each z ∈ Z. The corollary below thus follows immediately from the definition of this game.
Corollary 2 For every z ∈ Z and δ > 0 there is a strategy σ = σ(z, δ) and a stop rule t = t(z, δ) ≥ 1 for player 1 such that
for all strategies τ of player 2.
Let V(z) be the lower value of the game N (u)(z).
Lemma 2 V ≥ V .
Proof. Fix z ∈ Z and > 0. It suffices to construct a strategy σ for player 1 such that for all strategies τ for 2,
Referring to Corollary 2, let σ be the strategy that follows
and then follows
and so on.
Fix a strategy τ for player 2 and write E for the expectation operator E z,σ ,τ . Define random variables
It follows from our construction of σ that
for all n, and
The next lemma states a general property of the expectation of a lim sup.
Lemma 3 Eu * = inf s sup t≥s Eu(z t ).
For a proof, see Maitra and Sudderth [10] , Theorem 4.2.2. Now letV (z) be the upper value of the game N (u)(z). The next lemma, together with Lemma 2, will complete our sketch of the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. Since V = inf α<ω 1 V α , it suffices to show thatV ≤ V α for each α < ω 1 . This we do by induction on α.
FirstV ≤ V 0 becausē
where the inequality is by Lemma 3. For the inductive step, suppose thatV ≤ V β for all β < α. If α is a limit ordinal, then
So suppose that α is a successor. Then V α = T (u ∧ V α−1 ). Fix z and > 0. It suffices to show that there is a strategy τ for player 2 such that, for all strategies σ of player 1,
Define τ to be a strategy that follows a strategy τ 1 , which is /2-optimal in L * (u ∧ V α−1 )(z) up to time
If the stopping time θ is finite, the strategy τ then switches to τ 2 (z θ ), a strategy that is /2-optimal in N (u)(z θ ). It can be shown, with some effort and again with the aid of Lemma 3, that this strategy τ does the job. For the details of this argument, see Maitra and Sudderth [7] . A somewhat different proof is given in Maitra and Sudderth [10] .
Approximation Theorems
Consider a stochastic game in which the payoff is the indicator function of an arbitrary Borel subset E of H. LetV (E)(z) be the upper value starting from the initial state z.
Theorem 3 (Maitra, Purves, and Sudderth [6] )
As was remarked in Section 5, a stochastic game with payoff the indicator function of an open set corresponds to a leavable game after a change of coordinates. Thus Theorem 3 says that games with Borel set payoffs can, in a sense, be approximated by leavable games.
Next consider a stochastic game with payoff a bounded Borel measurable function f on H. LetV (f )(z) be the upper value. As in Section 2, letũ denote a bounded function defined on finite sequencesz n = (z, a 1 , b 1 , z 1 , . . . , a n , b n , z n ) and setũ * (h) = lim supũ(z n ), for h = (z, a 1 , b 1 ,  z 1 , . . 
.).
Theorem 4 (Maitra and Sudderth [10] )
Thus we can approximate games with bounded Borel functions as payoffs by lim sup games. (It will be shown in the next chapter that all these Borel games do in fact have values -so the bars can be removed in Theorems 3 and 4. Also, a proof will be given for Theorem 4.) It follows from the form of the algorithm in Section 4 together with Theorems 3 and 4 that the value of any game with a Borel payoff is completely determined by the one-day operator G. To see this, observe that each step in the algorithm for a leavable game L(u)(z) is determined by G, and that each step in the algorithm for a nonleavable game N (u)(z) amounts to another leavable game, which is also determined by G.
Generalizations
Theorems 1 and 2 can be extended to arbitrary sets S, A,and B in the framework of finitely additive probability theory. There is a drawback, however. Fubini's theorem fails for finitely additive measures and the value of the game may depend on the order of integration [8] .
There is also a countably additive generalization in which, as in [11] , S, A, and B are Borel subsets of Polish spaces with some additional requirements of compactness and continuity [9] .
